Consciousness, the Brain, and Josh Rasmussen’s Counting Problem

Consciousness Counting Problem Joshua Rasmussen
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Consciousness is one of the biggest philosophical questions we know of. David Chalmers says that consciousness has two issues: the easy question of consciousness and the hard question of consciousness. The former, while not easy per se, is much easier than the latter. The easy question has to do with everything that neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and so on, all pay attention to with questions such as: what are the neural correlates of perception, memory, belief, cognition, emotion, intuition, behavior, etc. and how can they be manipulated? How does thought/perception occur and how does it go wrong (e.g., cognitive biases, perceptual illusions)? How do thoughts/perceptions influence behavior? How are thoughts and behaviors shaped by biology and culture? Is the brain like a computer? And so on. These are all questions that we are relatively certain can be answered within the purview of these fields. Even if it is difficult to find the answers, we can be confident they have answers that will eventually be discovered. The hard question, however, is essentially this: how is it that non-conscious physical matter can give rise to conscious experience?

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Semantics and the Phenomenology of Meaning

When someone utters a word that reaches your ear, the sound gets broken down into component waves via Fourier transform which vibrate within cochlear fluid and cause the movement of mechanoreceptor hair cells at the organ of Corti to produce electrochemical signals in the form of neurotransmitter release whereby the movement of the fluid stimulates the filaments of individual cells receptor cells to become open to receive the potassium-rich endolymph, causing the cell to produce an action potential which is transmitted through the spiral ganglion to the auditory portion of the vestibulo-cochlear nerve to the the brain, which signals to the cortex with new information that is then compared to predictions based on prior experience in a Bayesian fashion to produce the phenomenology of the experience of hearing, interpreting, and understanding the word. But where (and how), in all this, does the phenomenology of meaning arise?

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Material and Immaterial: Why Materialism is Incomplete

physicalism materialism incomplete
(Photo by Rick Friedman/Corbis via Getty Images)

In the twentieth century, Jean-Paul Sartre famously said that existence precedes essence, which is the reverse order of what the Medieval philosophers believed. In this line of thinking, a thing first exists, and then due to its form of existing, it has essence bestowed upon it by observers. This is where the Existentialist idea of radical freedom came from. In the Medieval philosophy, you were your essence first, and it was God that bestowed upon you your existence. But that means your essence is immutable. In Existentialism, it is you that creates your essence to be what you want, and your essence is only determined by what you do, not by your intentions. What this idea ultimately concludes is that there is nothing special about an existing object apart from the meaning given to it by minds, or being-for-itself in Sartre’s parlance, denoting the objectness of the mind. But if the mind is an object, then what is it about the mind that makes it special, allowed to bestow meaning on the objects around it?

In this section I discuss why materialism offers only an incomplete explanation for consciousness.

See my other post on why spiritualism is untrue.

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